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September 26, 2013
Mr. Gino J. Agnello
Clerk of the Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
RE:

Verser v. Barfield, No. 11-2091

Dear Mr. Agnello:
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) and Circuit Rule 28(e), Plaintiff-Appellant
Glenn Verser responds to the Defendants-Appellees’ submission of supplemental
authority as follows:
1. States use different state-specific approaches, independent and distinct
from the federal approach, to the standard in reviewing a denial of the
right to poll the jury. In particular, the court in Wiseman v. Armstrong,
989 A.2d 1027 (Conn. 2010), emphasized that “harmless error has become
the standard that our Connecticut appellate courts normally use . . . .” Id. at
1036 (emphasis added). Other states have rejected the harmless error standard in
reviewing a denial of the right to poll the jury. See, e.g., Duffy v. Vogel, 905 N.E.2d
1175, 1179 (N.Y. 2009); Sandford v. Chevrolet Division of General Motors, 642 P.2d
624, 637-38 (Or. 1982). Even if state court rulings were binding on this court, they
are split on the question.
2. People v. Anzalone, 298 P.3d 849 (Cal. 2013), involved the defendant’s
forfeiture of the right to poll. The court’s application of harmless error in
that case is consistent with the federal standard for forfeiture of a right.
Supp. Response Br. of Defendants-Appellees at 21. It is also consistent
with those few federal cases in which the courts applied a harmless error
standard to the method of polling. U.S. v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719 (7th
Cir. 1978); Audette v. Isaksen Fishing Corp., 789 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1986).
But Mr. Verser’s case does not involve the method of polling; it involves a
denial of the right to poll.

3. This court applied a per se error standard to the denial of the right to poll
the jury in three separate cases after the Supreme Court first clarified the
distinction between trial error and structural error in Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991): United States v. Randle, 966 F.2d
1209, 1214 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. F.J. Vollmer & Co., Inc., 1
F.3d 1511, 1522-23 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d
1209, 1215 (7th Cir. 1994). This court was aware of the distinction, but
applied a per se error analysis, nonetheless.
Sincerely,
s/ Steven D. Schwinn
Steven D. Schwinn
Associate Professor of Law
The John Marshall Law School
315 South Plymouth Court
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(630) 848.2005
sschwinn@jmls.edu
Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 26, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing
Response to the Defendants-Appellees’ Submission of Supplemental Authority with
the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are
registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF
system.

s/ Steven D. Schwinn
Steven D. Schwinn
Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant
Dated: September 26, 2013
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Eleanor DUFFY, Appellant,
v.
James M. VOGEL et al., Respondents,
et al., Defendant.
Court of Appeals of New York.
March 31, 2009.
Background: Patient brought medical
malpractice action against two physicians,
alleging that they negligently had failed to
diagnose and treat tumor found in her
pelvic area. Following jury verdict in favor
of physicians, the Supreme Court, New
York County, Donna M. Mills, J., granted
patient’s motion to set aside verdict, and
declared mistrial. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 49 A.D.3d 22, 849
N.Y.S.2d 52, reversed. On remand, the Supreme Court, New York County, Stanley
L. Sklar, J., granted defense motion for
summary judgment. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, 50 A.D.3d 319, 855
N.Y.S.2d 440, affirmed. Patient appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Lippman,
C.J., held that trial court’s failure to poll
jury at plaintiff’s request could not be
harmless.
Reversed.
Smith, J., filed dissenting opinion.
1. Appeal and Error O1070(1)
Trial court’s failure to poll jury at
plaintiff’s request regarding its verdict in
favor of defendants in medical malpractice
action could not be harmless, and thus
rendered verdict invalid, regardless of fact
that jurors had signed verdict sheet; proper publication of verdict in open court was
essential to assure its integrity.
2. Trial O325(1), 342
Verdict may not be deemed finished
or perfected until it is recorded, and it may
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not be validly recorded without jury poll
where one has been sought.
3. Appeal and Error O1070(1)
Trial court’s failure to honor request
for jury poll, being necessary condition of
finished or perfected verdict, may never be
deemed harmless; harmless error analysis
is judicial device employed to sustain already perfected verdict, not to perfect verdict in first instance.
4. Trial O325(1)
Party has absolute right to have jury
polled, which is rooted in common law.

Jonathan M. Landsman, New York City,
for appellant.
Aaronson, Rappaport, Feinstein &
Deutsch, LLP, New York City (Steven C.
Mandell and Anthony J. Connors of counsel), for James M. Vogel, respondent.
Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy & Bach, LLP,
New York City (Daniel S. Ratner and Daryl Paxson of counsel), for Allan J. Jacobs,
respondent.
S 172OPINION OF THE COURT
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge.
At the conclusion of a long and complex
trial during which plaintiff sought to prove
that defendant physicians had committed
malpractice by failing to detect, diagnose
and properly treat a tumor situated in her
pelvis, the jury returned a verdict evidently exonerating defendants while purporting to award damages ‘‘for the plaintiff’’ in
the amount of $1.5 million. Shortly after
the verdict, plaintiff requested that the
jury be polled to ascertain whether ‘‘each
juror consents this is the verdict as read
by the foreperson.’’ The request was denied as ‘‘unnecessary’’ and the jury dis-
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charged. The trial court would, however,
subsequently acknowledge that it had
erred in denying the poll and, on that
ground, grant plaintiff’s posttrial motion to
set aside the verdict and declare a mistrial
(2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 34280[U] ). In the
ensuing litigation, defendants have conceded S 173that it was error not to poll the
jury, yet urge that harmless error analysis
may save the verdict.
[1] In the decision and order now before us, brought up for review by plaintiff’s
appeal as of right, pursuant to CPLR
5601(d), from an Appellate Division order
affirming the dismissal of her remaining
claims (50 A.D.3d 319, 855 N.Y.S.2d 440
[2008] ), a divided Appellate Division panel
agreed with defendants, and denied the
previously granted motion to set aside the
verdict. While the entire panel acknowledged that plaintiff had been entitled to
have the jury polled and even that the
entitlement was ‘‘absolute,’’ the majority
viewed the error as one of form only, since,
in its estimation, ‘‘the objective facts set
forth amply demonstrate[d] that polling
the jury would not have resulted in a
different verdict’’ (Duffy v. Vogel, 49
A.D.3d 22, 25, 849 N.Y.S.2d 52 [1st Dept.
2007] ). This view was, at bottom, premised upon the manner in which the verdict
had been rendered: each member of the
jury had signed the verdict sheet in response to each of the answered interrogatories, the jury’s responses to the interrogatories had been uniformly unanimous, and
during the foreperson’s recitation of the
verdict in open court, no juror cried out in
protest. The dissenters countered that
‘‘[i]t is simply impossible, short of clairvoyance, to decide that no juror in this case
would change his or her mind upon being
polled facing the litigants in open court’’
(id. at 32, 849 N.Y.S.2d 52), and, accordingly, would have held that the trial court’s
failure to honor plaintiff’s absolute right to

have the jury polled required that the
verdict be set aside, as the trial court had
done.
We now reverse.
At common law, it was recognized that
although jurors had agreed upon a verdict
within the confines of the jury room and
announced their verdict in open court, they
might yet be examined by poll to determine whether they remained wedded to
their verdict, and if it appeared that the
verdict had been due to mistake or partiality, the jurors would, prior to the recording of the verdict, have an opportunity to
‘‘go together and consider the better of it,
and alter what they have delivered’’ (2
Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown, at
299–300 [1800 ed] ). That jurors ‘‘should
be enabled to avail themselves of the locus
penitentiae, and correct a verdict which
they have mistaken, or about which, upon
further reflection, they have doubt’’
(Blackley v. Sheldon, 7 Johns 32, 33–34
[1810] ) has been recognized in the vast
majority of jurisdictions, and the polling of
jurors in open court has been viewed as
essential to the provision of such S 174a locus, since, without the device, the reservations of individual jurors about a verdict to
which they may have assented in the enforced privacy of the jury room under
misapprehension, pressure from fellow jurors or out of sheer exhaustion, would
likely never gain timely expression.
In New York, we have long recognized
that affording jurors a last opportunity
individually to express agreement or disagreement with the reported verdict, is,
when requested by a litigant, indispensable
to a properly published, and thereby perfected, verdict:
‘‘It is a general rule, that no verdict is of
any force but a public verdict given in
open court; until that is received and
recorded there is no verdict. When the
jury come to the bar to deliver their
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verdict, all or any of them have a right
to dissent from a verdict to which they
had previously agreed. (Root v. Sherwood, 6 John. 68.) A verdict is not
recognized as valid and final until it is
pronounced and recorded in open court:
the jury may change their mind and
disagree as to their verdict after they
have pronounced it in open court before
it is received and entered on the minutes. After a verdict is rendered or
announced and before it is entered, the
jury may be examined by the poll, if the
court please, and either of them may
disagree to the verdict. ( [Blackley] v.
Sheldon, 7 John. 32.) The expression in
the last case, ‘if the court please,’ would
seem to imply that the polling of the
jury was in the discretion of the court;
but in the case of Fox v. Smith, (3
Cowen, 23,) and Jackson ex dem. Fink
and others v. Hawks, (2 Wend. 619,) it is
decided to be the absolute right of a
party to have the jury polled on their
bringing in their verdict, whether it be
sealed or oral, unless he has expressly
agreed to waive that right’’ (Labar v.
Koplin, 4 N.Y. 547, 550–551 [1851] ).
[2] That a verdict may not be deemed
‘‘finished or perfected’’ until it is recorded,
and that it may not be validly recorded
without a jury poll where one has been
sought * (see Warner v. New York Cent.
R.R. Co., 52 N.Y. 437, 442 [1873] ), have
been uncontroversial propositions. Although we have not had the S 175opportunity
recently to reconsider them, they have
been applied over the years with axiomatic
force by New York’s intermediate appellate courts (see Brigham v. Olmstead, 10
A.D.2d 769, 197 N.Y.S.2d 570 [3d Dept.
1960] [‘‘Not until inquiry is made of the
whole jury, not merely the foreman, as to
* Although the early cases, such as Labar v.
Koplin (supra), in fact, required an express
waiver if the jury was not to be polled, the
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their verdict, and it is duly entered by the
Clerk is the verdict complete. Until it is
thus announced there is no verdict’’];
Muth v. J & T Metal Prods. Co., 74 A.D.2d
898, 425 N.Y.S.2d 858 [2d Dept.1980], lv.
dismissed 51 N.Y.2d 745, 432 N.Y.S.2d
365, 411 N.E.2d 784 [1980] [reinstatement
of verdict following appellate denial of previously granted motion to set aside the
verdict not possible because, in light of the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s request
to poll the jury, there was no valid verdict
to reinstate]; see also Luppino v. Busher,
119 A.D.2d 554, 556, 500 N.Y.S.2d 557 [2d
Dept.1986]; Ricchueto v. County of Monroe, 267 A.D.2d 1012, 701 N.Y.S.2d 550
[4th Dept.1999]; Matter of National
Equip. Corp. v. Ruiz, 19 A.D.3d 5, 12–14,
794 N.Y.S.2d 2 [1st Dept.2005] ). No cogent, principled argument is made for
their revision here.
[3] Inasmuch as, under New York law,
the honor of a request for a jury poll is a
necessary condition of a ‘‘finished or perfected’’ verdict, it follows that in this
State’s courts the failure to poll a jury may
never be deemed harmless. Harmless error analysis is a judicial device employed
to sustain an already perfected verdict, not
to perfect a verdict in the first instance.
A verdict in a jury trial is emphatically
not a judicial construct. Indeed, it is hard
to know upon what empirical basis a verdict untested in open court by direct inquiry of the individual jurors might be judicially deemed to be the final expression of
the jury’s true intention. Here, it is important to understand that the relevant
question is not whether the trial evidence
was sufficiently persuasive to impel a
hypothetical reasonable juror to vote in
favor of the announced verdict, but rather
entitlement is now deemed waived in the absence of a request.
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whether each juror chosen by the parties
to hear the case would, upon reflection,
publicly affirm that the verdict agreed to
in the jury room was the one he or she
actually intended. The exercise of individual conscience involved is one whose outcome defies prediction.
Certainly, the prediction called for may
not be based, as it was by the Appellate
Division, on the circumstance that jurors
have signed a verdict sheet. The proper
publication of a verdict in open court, so
long deemed essential to assure the integrity of the verdict, is not to be cast aside
as a mere formality on the theory that
jurors are prospectively bound to act in
accordance with their verdict sheet signatures. Indeed, in Root v. Sherwood, 6
Johns 68, 68 (1810), where the argument,
here exactly S 176reiterated, was made that
‘‘[t]he signing of the verdict is an express
assent by each juror to the verdict, and is
equivalent to a polling of the jury,’’ the
court responded,
‘‘There is no verdict of any force but a
public verdict, given openly in court;
until it was received and recorded it was
no verdict, and the jury had a right to
alter it as they may a private verdict.
The previous agreement, that the jury
might seal up their verdict, did not take
away from the parties the right to a
public verdict, duly delivered. There
being then no legal verdict in this case, a
new trial must be awarded.’’ (Id. at 69;
see also Dore v. Wyer, 1 A.D.2d 973, 974
[150 N.Y.S.2d 886] [2d Dept.1956] [denial of plaintiff estate administrator’s request for a jury poll as ‘‘unnecessary’’
upon the ground that 10 jurors had
signed the verdict sheet required reversal and a new trial since ‘‘(t)he administrat(or) had an absolute right to have
the jury polled, and the denial of that
right was serious error’’].)

Nor can there be any conceptually viable
contention that the outcome of the public
polling sought was foregone since the jurors in the present case privately signed
the verdict sheet in numerous places, particularly since, had they followed instructions and concluded their deliberations after finding that defendants had not been
negligent, their signatures would have
been significantly less numerous.
Finally, we do not think it sensible to
expect that a juror would in open court
spontaneously pipe up his or her disagreement with an announced verdict. Jurors
who have been pushed to a verdict about
which they have serious reservations are
not likely moments later in the solemn and
intimidating atmosphere of the courtroom
attending the announcement of the verdict
to feel free to express their reservations
unless it is made clear that it is permissible to do so and an opportunity is provided.
[4] It is doubtless true, as defendants
point out, that the absolute right of a party
to have a jury polled is rooted in the
common law, and not in statutory or constitutional enactment. It is also true that
in some jurisdictions, albeit a minority,
there exists no such right, and in others
the right is not viewed as absolute, but as
one which may in limited circumstances be
denied without impairing the verdict.
None of this argues persuasively for treating the right of a litigant to have a jury
polled as less than absolute in this jurisdiction. Jury polling ordinarily entails little
S 177additional burden in the conduct of a
trial, yet is demonstrably efficacious in
assuring that the trial’s outcome is in fact
the true verdict of the particular jury chosen by the parties to hear the case. A
jury verdict, once properly delivered may,
of course, be subsequently sustained
against claims of error upon evidentiary
analyses that courts are equipped to per-
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form. No court, however, may claim to
know each juror’s conscience so as to retrospectively offer assurance that the verdict was in its initial iteration what its
authors had actually intended. Only timely inquiry of jurors will disclose whether
their announced verdict truly expresses
their will, and it is for this reason, and not
out of unreasoned devotion to antique
forms, that the common-law insistence
upon jury polling has persisted. Harmless
error analysis in this context would
amount to no more than a speculative exercise, impermissibly substituting the
judgments of judges for those that would
have been made and disclosed by jurors
had their verdict been properly pronounced in open court.
Even if we were writing upon a clean
slate, which we are not, we would not
concur in the dissent’s view that it would
be a good idea to treat the denial of a
litigant’s right to have the jury polled as a
kind of potentially harmless error. Contrary to the premise of the dissent, jury
polling has never been justified on the
ground that there is a high probability that
it will uncover disparity between the announced verdict and what the jurors intended. Its justification rests instead
upon the right of a litigant to a public
verdict demonstrably that of the particular
jurors chosen in the case. Long, and we
think indispensable experience, has shown
that that basic entitlement, so closely enmeshed with and protective of the right to
trial by jury, may not be deemed secured
in any individual case simply upon the
foreperson’s announcement of a verdict—
even one multiply subscribed—and that
the claim to be able reliably to distinguish
in hindsight the case in which the failure to
honor the entitlement was or was not
harmless is highly suspect and should not
be adopted as a basis for law. While it is,
from defendants’ perspective, doubtless
nightmarish to face a new trial of this
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matter, sparing them a new trial upon the
approach advocated by the dissent is an
even less attractive option, prospectively
involving courts too confident of their ability to discern what is in a juror’s mind in
the unwitting validation of false verdicts
and the concomitant deprivation of true
verdicts.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate
Division should be reversed, with costs,
and a new trial ordered.
S 178SMITH, J. (dissenting).
The Court decides today that a failure to
poll a civil jury on request can never be
harmless error. This result is compelled
by no statute and supported by no binding
precedent. It results in a gross injustice
in this case, and will no doubt do so in
some future cases. And it is highly unlikely to do any practical good. Because I see
no justification for this decision, I dissent.
Doctors James Vogel and Allan Jacobs
were sued for medical malpractice. The
case was tried for two weeks, and a jury
decided in the doctors’ favor, filling out an
11 page verdict sheet containing 21 interrogatories. Five inapplicable questions
were not answered, but the answers to the
remaining 16 were all consistent, and every one of the 16 answers was signed by
every juror. All the answers were unanimous, though a 5–1 verdict would have
been valid (CPLR 4113[a] ). The foreperson announced all the answers in open
court, and declared as to each one that the
jury had answered unanimously.
After this, plaintiff’s counsel asked for a
poll of the jury, and the trial court mistakenly denied the request. For this reason,
the majority holds, the whole trial was a
waste of time and Doctors Vogel and Jacobs must undergo another one, running
the risk that the second jury will disagree
with the first.
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The majority’s rationale for this nightmarish result seems to have three parts.
One is verbal: the right to have a jury
polled on request has been described as
‘‘absolute’’ (Labar v. Koplin, 4 N.Y. 547,
550 [1851], quoted in majority op. at 174,
878 N.Y.S.2d at 247–48, 905 N.E.2d at
1176–77). The second is formal: ‘‘the honor of a request for a jury poll is a necessary condition of a ‘finished or perfected’
verdict’’ (majority op. at 175, 878 N.Y.S.2d
at 248, 905 N.E.2d at 1177). And the third
claims to be practical: it is impossible to
know, the majority says, what the result of
a poll will be unless the poll is conducted
(majority op. at 175–177, 878 N.Y.S.2d at
248–50, 905 N.E.2d at 1177–79). I find all
these reasons unconvincing.
We have indeed said that the right to
the poll of a jury on request is ‘‘absolute.’’
But it is clear that we meant only that a
denial of the request is always error—we
have not answered the question whether
the error may be harmless. The context
in which we used ‘‘absolute’’ in Labar confirms this. After quoting from a case that
had said ‘‘the jury may be examined by the
poll, if the court please,’’ we went on to
say:
‘‘The expression in the last case, ‘if the
court please,’ would seem to imply that
the polling of the jury was in the discretion of the court; but in the case of Fox
S 179v. Smith, (3 Cowen, 23,) and Jackson
ex dem. Fink and others v. Hawks, (2
Wend. 619,) it is decided to be the absolute right of a party to have the jury
polledTTTT’’ (4 N.Y. at 550–551.)
Thus, the right to a jury poll is ‘‘absolute’’ only in the sense that it is not a
matter of discretion with the court. The
‘‘absolute’’ nature of the right does not
imply that the denial of the right can never
be harmless error. Indeed, most cases of
harmless error involve the denial of rights
that are ‘‘absolute’’ in that sense. If a

court has discretion to grant or refuse a
party’s request, the denial of it is ordinarily not error at all, and there is no occasion
to consider whether the error is harmless.
The assertion that, where a request for
a jury poll is not honored, the verdict is
not ‘‘finished or perfected’’ is an abstraction, incapable of proof or disproof. It is
true because the majority says it is true,
and for no other reason. The formal logic
on which it seems to rest is not even
consistently applied. If the majority were
to take that logic to its limit, it should hold
that the poll is essential, whether a party
requests it or not. If the verdict is not
‘‘finished or perfected’’ once it is read in
open court, how can a party’s failure to
request a poll finish or perfect it? Or, if it
can, why cannot the harmlessness of an
error in refusing a request finish or perfect it equally well? Whether to apply
harmless error analysis should not turn on
the answer to such scholastic riddles,
but—since this is a situation in which our
conclusion is compelled by no statute and
no precedent—on whether permitting
harmless error analysis would be a good
idea.
The majority suggests it would not be a
good idea because it is always possible that
the error was not really harmless. The
majority says, in substance: You never
know until you ask whether there is a
juror (though in this case it would be
inconsequential unless there were two)
who would not say ‘‘yes’’ to the question:
‘‘Is this your verdict?’’ According to the
majority, ‘‘The exercise of individual conscience involved is one whose outcome defies prediction’’ (majority op. at 175, 878
N.Y.S.2d at 249, 905 N.E.2d at 1178).
I will make a prediction: In almost every case, the poll will confirm the verdict
as announced by the foreperson. There
are experienced trial lawyers who have
never seen a verdict upset by a jury poll—
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and others who have seen it once, and tell
the story to the end of their days. The
possibility that that rare event would occur
in this case—a case in which the jury’s
verdict was detailed, clear and specifically
endorsed by every juror’s S 180repeated signature, and in which defendants even had
a vote to spare—is vanishingly small.
Of course, I cannot say I am absolutely
certain that the trial court’s error here was
harmless—but that can never be said, of
any error. The sort of fanciful possibility
that the majority relies on exists in every
case, and if it were given the kind of
weight the majority gives it here, the
harmless error doctrine would not exist.
We have many times found errors to be
harmless where the chance that the error
determined the result was significantly
greater than it is in this case.
There is a fourth possible reason that
might support the result the majority
reaches—one the majority does not mention, but one that gives me a bit more
pause. It is the possibility of abuse. As I
have pointed out, a failure to poll a jury
will usually—indeed almost always—in fact
be a harmless error. Is there not then a
risk that trial judges will be tempted to
reject requests for jury polls, knowing that
the harmlessness of the error will protect
them from reversal?
I do not think so. I might feel differently if a jury poll were a burdensome procedure, or if there were some other reason
trial judges might seek to avoid it—but it
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is short and simple, and I do not think that
a jury poll is ever likely to be denied for
any reason except the reason we have
here: an honest mistake. Still, as a precaution, I might consider limiting the application of the harmless error doctrine to
cases where there is a particularly strong
reason to think the jury poll would not
have changed the result. This is certainly
such a case.
So far as I know, we have never before
today held that a particular kind of error
in a civil case cannot be harmless. That
does not mean that no such errors exist.
No doubt, for example, the wrongful denial
of a trial by jury in a civil case would not
be subject to harmless error analysis.
Still, I find it puzzling indeed that, by
virtue of today’s decision, we have afforded
a sacrosanct status never before conferred
on any right of a civil litigant to the quasimedieval ritual of the jury poll.
Judges CIPARICK, GRAFFEO,
READ, PIGOTT and JONES concur with
Chief Judge LIPPMAN; Judge SMITH
dissents in a separate opinion.
Order reversed, etc.

,

